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Government and Governance of Regional Triple Helix Interactions 
Mike Danson & Emanuela Todeva1 
Abstract: 
This conceptual paper contributes to the discussion on the role of regional government and regional 
triple helix constellations driving economic development and growth within regional boundaries.  We 
investigate the impact of regionalism and subsidiarity on regional triple helix constellations and the 
questions of governmentality, governance and institutional development at regional level. We put 
emphasis on the fact that the position of regional authorities in the structure of government and policy 
boundaries are best implemented at a regional level (the principles of regionalism and subsidiarity), 
and that localised policy practices represent a more precise view on the government-industry-
university interactions (the principle of governmentality). We look at the regional triple helix context 
as a prerequisite for stakeholder engagement, enhancing innovation capabilities and entrepreneurial 
behaviour. The paper identifies the drivers behind regional competitiveness and economic 
development, and investigates the positive externalities from strong triple helix constellations, as well 
as the impact of government support and institutionalised cooperation on value creation and value 
capture at the level of the locale. The paper offers a stylised model (Fig. 1) of the conditions for value 
creation and value capture and offers a critical overview of the debates around the rationale for 
regional governments. Examples are drawn from Scotland, England and some comparable parts of 
Europe. 
Keywords: regional development agencies; triple helix; regional governance; public policy; regional 
economic development  
1. An introduction to regions and development within boundaries  
This paper explores the theoretical background for interventions at the regional level according to 
defined macroeconomic objectives and policy aims. We discuss the rationale for localised governance 
and specific institutional arrangements at the regional level. We look at the evolution of Triple Helix 
interactions between the private sector, the regional public authorities and the universities and 
college education providers, shaping the regional impact from policy implementation.  
Our previous research has argued that decisions on allocating public resources and policy 
implementation practices pose significant challenge for areas of jurisdiction that are relatively 
peripheral to major metropolitan concentrations of economic power and activities, such as the 
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landward regions of Scotland, Norway and Sweden (Danson and de Souza, 2012). Regional agricultural 
and land-based economies have natural geographic boundaries that include sparsely populated areas, 
fragmented services, and rural communities, and for many of these there are strong arguments for 
trying to balance the benefits of extra-regional connections with solutions that do not further 
disadvantage and exacerbate isolation and limited market size. These challenges are contrasted with 
the inner-city questions that cut across a broad regional geography of decreasing or relatively 
prosperous regional economies (see for example Syrett, 2011, for an exploration of these themes in 
London). Many inner cities are underperforming across a range of social and economic indicators that 
call for government intervention (Syrett, 2011), although they are subject to agglomeration 
economies of scale and scope (Krugman, 1991). Underdevelopment and underperformance are two 
cases for government intervention, when it is accepted that without a regeneration effort and 
investment, the localised market failure cannot be remedied by itself.  
Further, in rural areas the region should be considered as the most appropriate jurisdiction level for 
the delivery of certain policies, such as and especially in the areas of R&D, technology and innovation 
(CEC, 2014; Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2011). The case for regional policy intervention justifies the 
need for specific organisations and institutions to operate at a subnational scale (Armstrong, 1997; 
King, 1984). It follows that the region offers a mezzo-level focus for these functions and interventions 
of government in order to minimise the effect of market failure and to optimise the opportunities 
offered by public investment. At the regional level, public authorities can secure economies of scale, 
scope and co-location in policy implementation and can enable a bottom-up approach (Halkier and 
Danson, 1997; Danson and Lloyd, 2012) to capturing localised positive externalities (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998).  
The aim of this paper is to review the theoretical implications of the notion that regions represent an 
appropriate level to arrange collaborations and to promote innovations. Following from this, it is 
proposed that the scope of intervention is focused at the middle level government authority. The 
paper therefore seeks to address the questions of: a) identifying the drivers behind regional economic 
development; b) positioning regional authorities in the structure of government responsible for the 
implementation of innovation policies for growth; and, c) analysing the role and impact of localised 
institutions and triple helix governance and government support on regional capabilities for growth.  
In the subsequent parts of this paper we outline the theoretical foundations of governance and 
governmentality2 in order to explain the role that regional authorities play in this process. Then we 
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focus on the recent history of the regional authorities in the UK and the drivers for enhancement of 
local capabilities, among which are universities. We interrogate the Triple Helix model and its 
application at regional level or the ability of regional governments, local businesses and universities 
to generate a positive dynamic for sustainable growth. Finally, we analyse different approaches and 
forms of intervention that are undertaken in the UK with a critical discussion of the relatively more 
recent evolution of Scottish Enterprise - the Scottish regional development agency (RDA) - and 
economic development interventions, compared with Oxfordshire region, where the RDA was 
abolished in 2010. Conclusions and recommendations are made as to how regional triple helix 
constellations are strengthened by the universities raising their local profile while pursuing 
internationalisation and global visibility. The contrasting cases of South Oxfordshire and Scotland 
reveal that effective triple helix constellations depend both on how universities blend with the 
regional institutional landscape, and the existence of regional authorities as a coordination agency. 
The next section discusses the nature and sources of governmentality at national and sub-national 
level. 
2. Government and governance of the economic development process 
Governance is a system / mechanism for allocation of resources, and for exercising control and co-
ordination of economic activities that facilitate strategic direction, accountability, transparency and 
wealth creation (Todeva, 2013). Economic growth, productivity and efficiency are all seen as deriving 
from this wealth creation, and in the context of increasing global connectivity and transparency 
through the advancement of the internet technology, ICT and communications. These processes and 
technologies affect governmentality beyond the notion of e-government and equal access. 
Governance encompasses particular institutional forms that facilitate value creation and localised 
capturing of value. 
There is a shared view across many theoretical perspectives that public governance involves 
simultaneously: a) governance of the society and economy; b) institutionalisation of justice in the 
public domain; and, c) management of the resource allocation process through institutionalisation of 
incentives and constraints (Wamsley, 1990, pp. 21-29). The main challenges to public governance are: 
to engage with these activities and functions while keeping accountability of the agents and 
institutions, their legitimacy, and counteracting design flaws in the governance principles and 
procedures (Koppell, 2010).  
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governing (Lemke, 2002; Foucault, 2008). 
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Regulation and governance performed by the state imply fraud prevention, protection against 
opportunistic behaviour, the establishment of rules, actions that can mitigate risks from future 
failures, or financing and supervision over resource utilisation (Corder, 2009). All of these activities 
and functions are considered to be most effectively performed at national level and supported by 
national institutional arrangements, where regional and local representations do not have a remit to 
differentiate. 
The economics of governance paradigm postulates that the regulation of a socio-economic system 
requires a legitimate government that has authority and powers, as well as the capacity and 
capabilities, to generate the rules that govern economic behaviour within the system of their 
jurisdiction. National / federal authorities hence have the power and legitimacy to make allocative 
decisions and implement policies, where regional authorities constitute hierarchically subordinate 
arms of power. 
The economics of ‘good’ governance, however, have embraced the challenge for an ‘ethical’ code of 
practice beyond accountability. These are some universal principles such as fairness, justice, or 
transcendental publicity that require governments to absorb a moral position vis-à-vis the governed 
(Kant, 1785). Governmentality, hence, refers to effective and morally-just actions through transparent 
institutions and open consultation with stakeholders. Regional triple helix constellations bear the 
brunt of achieving effective, fair and just allocative decisions. 
There are two diversions from this mainstream argumentation on governance. One is related to the 
notion of global governance and the cultural and political implications of the world being represented 
by a heterogeneous system of players among which are national law-makers, national law-followers, 
international law-followers, and unequal distribution of power among these agents. The second is the 
regional dimension, where complex socio-economic realities emerge out of localised interactions 
between economic actors and demand more particularistic solutions – again implemented by 
legitimate and empowered arms and branches of government. 
The plurality of socio-economic contexts and governing arrangements at regional and national level 
stems from different social histories and memories (path dependence), from different levels of 
industrialisation, economic development, and different degree of liberalisation of the market forces 
(economic determinism), and from different political ideologies and cultural frameworks (political 
determinism) (Todeva, 2010). The social and political sciences have not been able so far to distil 
universal principles that establish the perfect moral order across all modalities of governance, or levels 
of power. 
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Although citizens of autonomous states could choose an endless variety of laws and moral principles 
to govern their affairs, allocative decisions about scarce resources require a unifying authority with a 
unique capacity of power, where political direction and transcendental justice and fairness are 
embodied in institutionally organised decisions and actions at local sub-national and supra-national 
level (Kant, 1785).  
The argument in this paper is that governments and regional authorities as regulators of socio-
economic systems and localised institutional environments are strategic actors in their capacity to 
actively shape economic behaviour, implementing various policies that facilitate economic 
interactions. Hence, there is a strong asymmetry between those making the law and those following 
it (Todeva, 2010). Regional and local authorities as extensions to the national level of government 
shorten the distance between decision making and implementation, and as such they facilitate the 
stakeholder consultation part of the policy process. Regional authorities enhance both the value 
creation and the value capture at the level of the locale. The level of agglomeration of geographic 
areas, however, is arbitrary, and multiple levels of government intermediation (i.e. regional vs. local, 
vs. community-based authorities) are not necessarily guarantees for effective decision making, or for 
efficient implementation process. The direction of the regional effects on the triple helix constellations 
is visualised on Fig. 1. The next section of the paper looks at different mechanisms that enhance the 
value added by regional authorities, which offsets the costs of administration. 
3. The rationale for regional authorities and mezzo level public administration  
Authoritative allocation of resources is central to human society (Musgrave, 1959; Newlands, 1997; 
Russell and Waste, 1998). The costs of the public administration process, however, can vary according 
to different implementation regimes, where different regulatory mechanisms and governance forms 
are adopted. Administrative costs can accumulate from: the efforts to negotiate and take political 
decisions; the monitoring and control of policy implementation; the costs of termination of policies; 
the costs of institution building and support; and the general costs of administration and management 
(Frantz, 1997, Greenwood, 1997). Rational agents in this context are those that can calculate and 
minimise these costs – motives that carry no ethical value and, hence, no distributive justice. At the 
same time, when evident increase of costs is identified, the best authority to undertake a cost-benefit 
analysis are the regional authorities, who stand in-between the spending local authorities and the 
grant giving national authority (CEC, 2014). Intermediation in governance is rarely recognised for its 
value added through coordination and supervision (Fig. 1). 
Implementing politically motivated administrative reforms, market oriented or otherwise, is not 
neutral. Changing the rules of the game by governments changes the probable winners and losers in 
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political contests, and pre-determines who would be disenfranchised in this process (Knott and Miller, 
1987; Russell and Waste, 1998). Regional governments, therefore, are constituted to minimise the 
number and scale of disenfranchised local citizens. Governments are the managers of a reform 
process, and their political choices pre-select the outcomes for all. Minimising the negative impact of 
policies hence is another source of value added. Devolution to the Scottish Parliament in 1999 was 
partly in response to the demand for democratic accountability over economic development powers 
that had been the administrative responsibility of UK government departments, QUANGOs and other 
non-departmental bodies. Synergies, coherence and efficiencies were expected to complement this 
move of government and governance closer to the actors within Scotland (Newlands, 1997; Danson 
and Lloyd, 2012). 
The distinction between ‘principals and agents’, and between ‘governors and governed’ is among the 
questions of governance that open a wide schism of rights, influence, and domination, where the 
conflict of interests frames an endless contest between different groups of actors (Todeva, 2010). 
Regional authorities therefore are at the crossroads of a complex political process that arises when 
resource allocation takes place. Multiple layers of government may obscure the process of resource 
allocation when efficiencies are pursued, but can add value when market failures are addressed at a 
localised level, which offsets the overall costs. 
From an institutional point of view it is difficult to discriminate clearly the distinction between leading 
institutions that represent the foundations of government, or agencies engaged in distributive 
decision making and resource allocation at the regional level, and other institutional stakeholders that 
influence the policy process and support the implementation of distributive decisions. A 
discriminatory principle that can be used to categorise institutions at a regional level is whether they 
perform a utility function, or a normative (regulatory) function. Specific normative questions that can 
be asked at a regional level are: the clear definition of the public interest, and the role prescribed to 
and played by the public agencies in the governance process (Todeva, 2010). While the normative 
questions are related to political choices, the utility questions derive from the implementation 
process, and focus on the actual working of government. In the practice of economic development, 
this separation of utility and normative is demonstrated in some of the rationales for arms-length 
RDAs, as discussed below. 
All functions and operations of regional public authorities have both utility (practice) and normative 
(rules) aspects. There is uncritical acceptance of decisions as morally neutral and empirically self-
evident. This is due to the essentially technicist idea of organizational analysis that decisions are 
divorced from the moral questions of the ‘good’. Decision-based analysis is usually trivialized, and 
questions of power and influence are neglected altogether (Harmon, 1998). This applies not only to 
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generalised political decisions regarding the establishment of fundamental co-ordination 
mechanisms, but to specific administrative decisions on allocation of resources at the regional level. 
Moral and ethical considerations on the distribution of outcomes to community and society at large 
are substituted with arguments for cost-efficiency (Todeva, 2010). Regional authorities (or national, 
for that matter) are exempt from being judged for their moral and ethical foundations, where the 
economic rationale for governance dominates observations. 
Decisions involve distribution of resources, which are material in nature and are unequally accessible 
in a society. Distribution of resources in heterogeneous systems of unequal human agents involves 
judgements on human needs and intellectual capabilities, assessment of value, and the use of 
preferences to overcome resource constraints. Administrative decisions involve negotiations and a 
subsequent administrative control, and hence are in the realm of realities and praxis, rather than in 
the realm of a priori knowledge and judgement. The translation of a priori knowledge and moral 
judgement to institutional practice is obscured by agency interests and capacity, organisational 
procedures and legacies, or the acting and choices of human agents in power. Decisions by public 
authorities cannot be divorced from the process of decision-making, where interests are recognised, 
motives are enacted, and outcomes are negotiated. We can put a clear distinction between those that 
make the decisions (law-makers), and those that are subjected to the redistributive impact from these 
decisions (law-followers) (Todeva, 2010). Regional authorities as such (Fig. 1) enhance the capacity of 
law-makers, but do not guarantee either the fairness of the law, or the effectiveness of the rules and 
procedures developed at sub-national level. However, they provide a narrow definition of the 
localised stakeholders.  
Figure 1: Regional Triple Helix Constellations 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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The legitimacy of the decision-making authority and the administrative capabilities of government 
officials to enact decisions are of critical importance. Under-resourced regional governments, hence, 
could be lacking both administrative capacity and political legitimacy, which could undermine their 
operations and impact (Todeva, 2010). The rationale for regional government authority can be 
undermined or enhanced by the administrative capacity and dynamic capabilities of local agents and 
institutions. 
 
4. The rationale for regional government support  
The concept of governmentality, discussed in the previous section, employs a very broad definition of 
the role of government among which is the responsibility for a morally just allocation of resources, 
while counteracting market failure. Active engagement by government in economic management on 
the grounds of stabilisation, distribution, allocation, and growth, has been discussed extensively in the 
governance and economic policy literature (Musgrave, 1959). Macroeconomic stabilisation policy 
functions of government are held to be most effectively and efficiently delivered at the highest 
administrative level possible, or at the level of the nation-state (e.g. the UK Westminster government). 
In the geographical hierarchy of vertically integrated governments, allocation and growth objectives 
are promoted as more effectively and efficiently delivered at the national and sub-national state levels 
by regional and sub-regional authorities (e.g. the Scottish Government and local authorities) 
(Newlands, 1997).  
There is a rationale for intervention by governments to increase and improve economic efficiency 
(Newlands, 1997; Keating, 2006). In cases of absence of an alternative market solution, the needs of 
actors for land, labour, capital, technology and entrepreneurship, and for the optimal allocation of 
society’s resources, coupled with the societal need for innovation and upgrade of skills and capabilities 
increases the demand for local coordination of supply. Regional innovation and economic 
development policies provide a localised framework of incentives for local industry-universities and 
other public sector innovation actors (as promoted by the European Commission (CEC, 2014)). 
Regional triple helix constellations hence become essential for the delivery of such policies (Fig. 1). 
Yet, the triple helix literature rarely recognises the role of regional environments and institutional 
arrangements that exhibit the selection choices of regional and local authorities and innovation actors. 
The establishment of a regional policy framework is consistent with broader social democratic political 
thinking which served in the early post-war period to influence the specific forms of state intervention 
(Giddens, 1997). The evolving development of regional authorities has enabled governments to secure 
a greater integrated policy focus in order to secure network gains in public administration and more 
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effective joint working with the private sector (Lloyd, 2008). This focus on a localised metropolitan or 
(sub-)regional dimension coincides also with the neoliberal economic agenda where regeneration 
through public - private partnerships is entangled with land and property development schemes to 
secure economic recovery, investment, and employment. Examples of such localised policy solutions 
are the Enterprise Zones (Lloyd, 2008; Lloyd and Danson, 1991) and the Urban Development 
Corporations (Deakin and Edwards, 1993; Danson and Lloyd, 2012). These localised models assume 
regular supply of skills from local or distant education providers and do not see the universities as 
major players in the policy process. 
A regional policy institutional framework based on defined incentives, disincentives, and interventions 
has been promoted nationally over a long period (Armstrong, 1997; Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; HM 
Treasury, 2001, 2007) and within the European Union (CEC, 2014) to achieve convergence in relative 
regional economic activity whilst contributing to national economic objectives. Policies and actions at 
the regional level in this context offer the potential for enabling more strategic thinking and 
consistency in public and private decision making at the appropriate scales (Regional Policy 
Commission, 1996; Danson and Lloyd, 2012). Increasingly, regionalism3 also feeds into the neo-liberal 
agenda for achieving geographical competitiveness and sustainable economic growth and 
development (Danson and Lloyd, 2012; Bailey et al., 2010).  
For the last quarter of a century, the pursuit of ‘competitiveness’ has come to dominate the 
macroeconomic strategy and policy domains (CEC, 1994; HM Treasury, 2001; Danson and Lloyd, 2012). 
This is complementary to the regionalism agenda as it promotes the idea of endogenous growth 
through competition between nations and regions. In good times and bad, however, there has also 
been a recognition that for this to be sustainable economic growth it must also be inclusive. Indeed, 
the Cecchini Report (Cecchini, 1988) on the completion of the single market identified this as a pre-
requisite and as an elementary pillar in a successful European Union. Since then, various treaties and 
interventions have promoted this twin approach of regional economic development institutions and 
strategic interventions, pursuing economic strategy based on the dual aims of ‘competitiveness and 
inclusion’ (Fig. 1). In the example of Scotland, which maintains its RDA, pursuing the twin objectives, 
sustainable development is understood essentially to involve the community across all dimensions of 
the economy, society and the environment and to being accepted across all social partners - trade 
unions, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), community, and voluntary sectors (Danson et al., 2012; 
Danson and Lloyd, 2012). This can be seen to contrast with the experiences of the RDAs in England 
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cultural, or political affiliation. 
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before their abolition, with their lack of democratic control through directly elected regional 
authorities (Bailey et al., 2010). 
These steps to encourage the movement and consolidation of powers to the regional level were 
supported by the parallel and complementary promotion of the concept of ‘subsidiarity’ (taking and 
delivering policies at the most appropriate jurisdictional level as defined by Armstrong (1997). 
Creating an environment and platform at the sub-national level where key players can interact more 
effectively has been on various agenda for a few decades, and longer in some territories (Halkier and 
Danson, 1997; Halkier, 2006; Danson and Lloyd, 2012). Within this context, the `local' level appears as 
the most efficient for the development and delivery of a number of functions for SME support (for 
instance, in Scotland this is the responsibility of local government authorities through local Business 
Gateways) for occupational training, or other regional or innovation policies (Halkier and Danson, 
1997; Danson and Lloyd, 2012). Generally, the rationale for empowering regional authorities supports 
the establishment of specific forms of organisations and policy instruments, which in the recent 
history in the UK are the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), and more specifically, Scottish 
Enterprise (Danson and Lloyd, 2012). 
A model RDA is defined as being in a semi-autonomous position vis-à-vis its sponsoring political 
authority, supporting mainly indigenous firms by means of `soft' policy instruments (Halkier and 
Danson, 1997, p245). It is a multifunctional and integrated agency, the level of which may be 
determined by the range of policy instruments it uses. Consistent with the thrust of the growth model 
described above, RDAs are associated with promoting `bottom-up' development and realising 
endogenous potential (Stöhr, 1989). Such a bottom-up approach is in contrast to the more 
conventional, traditional top-down regional policy arrangements characterised as relatively dirigiste 
(Cooke and Morgan, 1998). The deliberate spatial dimension to economic development incorporates 
the provision of regional incentives and other forms of infrastructure for innovative firms and 
universities, and generally the RDAs provide a complementarity, and reciprocity, with the national 
regional policy framework. As RDAs work “outside the mainstream government” arguably they are 
better placed to facilitate the pursuit of public policies without direct government intervention making 
the development agency approach to regional economic development relatively more acceptable to 
the full range of social partners, without necessarily undermining accountability and legitimacy 
considerations (Halkier and Danson, 1997, p243). RDAs, hence, are designed as focal triple helix actors 
without a reference to the triple helix model, or the national innovation priorities and targets. 
RDAs are now ubiquitous as a key institution for delivering regional economic development across 
Europe, with the notable exception of the position in England (Danson et al., 2012; Bailey et al., 2010). 
European Union regulations and implementation strategies (see CEC, 2014) have similarly led to a 
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degree of uniformity across the EU in the landscape of governance, infrastructure, and innovation 
systems so that the concept and practice of the triple helix model have become embedded into the 
current round of ERDF and ESF regional development programmes (CEC, 2015). 
In the regional milieux of economic actors, the localised supply of skills and innovation capabilities is 
assumed, and regional governments shape the environment for regional economic development and 
innovation (Fig. 1). There are operational and resource relationships between local / regional / 
national government, local / regional /national agencies, universities and research institutions, as well 
as private sector businesses and community-based organisations. Collectively or otherwise, as 
described in the case study areas in Slovenia and Sweden, for example (Danson et al., 2012), these 
players create an institutional framework for the specific purpose of designing, developing and 
delivering a triple helix approach to addressing the management of these territorial spaces (Morgan, 
2007). Forming a crucible for the research, development, innovation and commercialisation of 
concepts, products and processes being generated by universities and other laboratories therefore 
has become an essential priority of programmes within regional, national and European strategies 
(Asheim et al., 2003; Klofsten et al., 2015).  
Across the EU, there has been a maturing convergence in national and regional administrative and 
institutional frameworks overall, within the context of diversity in economic conditions and regional 
economies, becoming more complex in structural terms. As regionalism (Fig. 1) leads to geographical 
imbalances in economic and industrial activity becoming more evident, so the European Union and 
national players have recognised and pursued strategies to realise potential at sub-national levels 
(CEC, 2014; Lawton Smith and Waters, 2015; Nozawa, 2015). Particularly with regard to research, 
development and technology innovations, at the core of the triple helix concept, there are concerns 
over the relationship between geographic imbalances and the capacity of regional authorities to 
address these through endogenous developments, as Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2011) have explored 
for peripheral regions with a particular focus on Scotland and Ireland informing their analyses. As 
trade, investment, knowledge and technology flows are global in nature in the areas of smart 
specialisation and higher technologies especially (Cooke, 1995; Asheim et al., 2003), and there may be 
instances of plants being attracted to benefit from some localised endowments, non-core regions will 
struggle to compete (see Danson and de Souza, 2012, for assessment of the position across the 
northern periphery of Europe). The ‘branch plant’ problem of the 1970s and 80s explored the lack of 
higher order functions, powers and R&D facilities inherent in much of the inward investment 
introduced to the ‘regions’ across the UK (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; Harris and Thomas, 2009) and 
Ireland (O’Leary, 2015). As the staff and resources of the research institutions located in the ‘problem 
regions’ outwith the metropolitan core are still strongly oriented to their national and international 
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discipline bases, the challenges of creating meaningful clusters and networks regionally are 
exacerbated (Bergum, 2012; Lindegaard, 2012). The closure of the local science and development 
laboratories in Scotland of the nationalised steel, coal and shipbuilding industries in the first half of 
the 1980s disrupted the capacity of these basic sectors to pursue innovations and developments 
appropriate to the regional industrial complex. So, regional partnerships and helixes that exercise 
concerted efforts to enhance location advantages and attract investment may be unable to deliver 
the positive outcomes anticipated by competitiveness strategies based on R&D and innovation if key 
elements of the sector are absent. 
The efficiency of governments both at regional and national level is measured by the extent of 
achievement of the policy objectives, compared to the costs of policy implementation (including 
monitoring and control) – whether it is related to market regulation, or to direct intervention in the 
economy. This evaluation does not consider the moral grounds for these policy objectives. The 
implementation of policy objectives involves not only allocation of resources, but building coalitions 
of agencies that bargain and negotiate between themselves over certain outcomes. The political 
authority that shapes the regulatory environment which subsequently affects individual and 
organisational behaviour is the leading agency of change and reform in a society. The level of this 
authority within the hierarchy of government can be determined uniquely for individual policy 
initiatives. The scope for triple helix interactions, hence, can vary. 
Political objectives, institutional constraints, and individual motivations seem to be intertwined into a 
tight node that drives the continuous policy process. In this context, the social contract between the 
government and the public implicitly requires the support of an appropriate institutional framework, 
political leadership, and widely spread legitimacy of the administrative agencies (Todeva, 2010). In 
this environment, both regional and national authorities may have an issue with their reputation and 
output activities. 
Regarding the issue of government intervention, behaviourism appears as complementary to 
institutionalism, as both explain how institutional constructs that produce social norms and 
subsequent behaviours (Russell and Waste, 1998) are simultaneously embedded at a national and at 
a regional level of authority. Institutions are necessary to change and maintain certain value 
preferences. However, these preferences, motivations and commitments are very often a subjective 
outcome of a cultural process of interpersonal interactions and a policy process of negotiations and 
bargaining, or what Kant refers to as imperfect reasons (1875). In this way, the Triple Helix model 
refers to a ‘culture-specific phenomena’, or culturally and institutionally embedded interactions. 
Neither behaviourism nor institutionalism have developed definitions of preferences and choices that 
represent perfect intentions, or prescriptions for the focus of regional vs. national. In fact, individual 
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preferences and choices are defined as imperfect motivations in a Kantian sense, or humans pursuing 
the satisfaction of their individual interests (Todeva, 2010). As such, the stakeholder approach co-
aligns the individual with the institutional, where regional/ national boundaries become an issue of 
practice, rather than an issue of norm and legislative power. The triple helix literature does not 
address questions of levels of government and subsidiarity, or the regionalism in national innovation 
systems. The triple helix model is not particularly interested in the questions of innovation for 
competitiveness. The governmentality issue is addressed as the perpetual cycles of interactions across 
the helices, ignoring the imbalances of power, or the variations in the level of authority, subordination, 
or who bears the costs of triple helix interactions. The triple helix, however, as an heuristic tool, 
outlines the principles for identifying regional stakeholders. 
Stakeholder engagement for economic development ultimately brings the challenge of public-private 
interactions, building innovation and support systems, and facilitation of sustainable investment 
flows. The triple helix model calls for stakeholder engagement and interactions in a productive 
capacity, and, from the establishment of the multi-agency, multi-annual and multi-functional GEAR 
(Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal) project, through area initiatives to the Strathclyde Regional 
Partnership, the building of a consensual approach to the strategic generation and delivery of 
economic development programmes in the region and Scotland was based on an inclusive approach 
to stakeholder involvement (Danson et al., 1999). 
5. Stakeholders and harnessing the triple helix interactions at regional level  
The Triple Helix as a concept is recognised to have a transformative effect on industry performance, 
generating accelerated knowledge and technology transfer between the public and the private sectors 
and inducing systemic change at regional, national and global levels (Etzkowitz and Ranga, 2010). In 
recent years we have observed a radical shift in the approach of governments – as active orchestrators 
of triple helix relationships, pursuing economic development through innovation and cluster policies; 
implementing institutional changes through community and participative practices; and influencing 
industry transformations through collaborative public-private funding, R&D procurement, stimulating 
university – industry interactions and the co-location of technology firms within specific regional 
boundaries alongside supply chain upgrade (Bailey et al., 2010; Danson and Lloyd, 2012; Benneworth 
et al., 2015). The establishment of key sector fora and initiatives focused in particular locations across 
Scotland reflects such a strategic approach (Scottish Government, 2015), with local world-leading 
universities also encouraged and enabled to participate in wider collaborations such as UK Catapult 
Centres, Horizon 2020 and open innovation schemes (Kerry and Danson, this volume). The inclusion 
of universities and branch plants which are also active in global networks facilitates knowledge 
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transfer into the regional economy, reinforcing the positive potential of the triple helix to deliver wider 
and deeper benefits to all local stakeholders.  
As demonstrated in the literature and policy and strategy documents at national and European levels 
cited above, the triple helix model is expected to enable mapping of complex stakeholder interactions 
and to explain the positive development effects of collaboration between the public and the private 
sector. Unfortunately, regarding sub-national governance this economic approach to cooperation is 
underdeveloped in addressing the issues of investment, co-financing for innovation, or the 
interactions and transaction costs and their impact on competitiveness (Fig. 1). The regional vs. 
national level of innovation system performance is an essential question to address when identifying 
the lead triple helix actors. Co-financing and triple helix participation, driving innovation and growth 
can take place at different levels of government / industry, as well as across levels. 
Regional innovation systems (RIS) are perceived as building blocks for national innovation systems 
(NIS), where all interrelated institutional actors that create, diffuse and exploit innovation within a 
region are mobilised by specific political objectives. More narrowly, these are local private sector R&D 
departments, universities, public institutes and research laboratories that search and explore 
technological innovations and leverage their knowledge and capabilities for regional growth (Chung, 
2002). The essence of RIS is the bundle of user-producer relationships that are embedded in localised 
industrial competitiveness and national regulatory frameworks, and resemble interactions and flow 
of resources, including labour, capital and knowledge mobility. A regional approach is more effective 
to formulate and implement, as the leading actors within the triple helix are more clearly 
interdependent and co-aligned for collaboration (Chung, 2002).  
The regional focus for innovation is promoted also by the idea that innovation is context specific, and 
hence, regional context is more easy and appropriate to capture and assimilate (Doloreux, et.al., 
2005). The concept of ‘contextual innovation’ is based on the assumption that innovative activity of 
firms is based to a large degree on localized resources such as a specialized labour market, 
subcontractor and supplier systems, local learning processes and spill-over effects, local traditions for 
cooperative and entrepreneurial attitudes, local supporting agencies and organizations, and the 
physical presence of customers and users (Cooke, 2001, Tödtling & Kaufmann, 2001, Asheim, et.al., 
2003). 
The literature acknowledges that innovation occurs more easily in situations of geographic 
concentration and proximity, where regional clusters play a crucial role and regional authorities 
intervene with more impact (Danson et al., 1990; Doloreux, et.al., 2005). Regional triple helix actors 
and regional stakeholders hence hold a leading position in building social relationships that frame the 
15 
 
activities of production, consumption and exchange. This is supported by substantial evidence of 
strong regional correlations between regional science-based outputs and GDP, or industry 
competitiveness (Lewison, 1991, Huggins, 2003, Howells, 2005). The literature goes further and 
identifies five types of institutionalised stakeholders that play a role as regional brokers and 
intermediaries - associative, behavioural, cognitive, regulative and consultative (Doloreux et.al., 
2005). These institutions shape all regional triple helix actors and, hence, determine the dynamics 
within the regional triple helix. The impact of the regional institutional context (Fig. 1) can be 
measured in terms of governance, control, facilitation and optimisation in multi-lateral collaborations 
at a regional level and the practice of engagement in the transfer of knowledge and technology across 
the industry-university-government interface. 
Regional triple helix constellations exhibit specific collaborative capacity and business models for 
cooperation in regions, and stakeholder engagement in decisions and sustainable solutions. There are 
already observations in the literature that investigate both the policy mixes and implementation at 
the regional level, particularly for regional smart specialisation, and the institutional and triple helix 
dynamics during the policy design and implementation stages (Nauwelaers et al., 2014; Benneworth, 
et.al., 2015).  
The synergies in the regional triple helix emerge when entrepreneurialism becomes a norm embedded 
in the culture, invisibly guiding actors to collaborate. Territorial cohesion therefore emerges out of 
smart and localised policy interventions that deliver ‘coordination at a distance’ (Benneworth, et.al., 
2015).  
Universities among the localised triple helix actors are both subject to transformation regimes and act 
as a source of transforming practices, such as converting occasional entrepreneurial activities into 
regular behaviours, and ultimately into regional landmarks. The transformation of the status of 
universities in their urban and regional context creates significant impacts in terms of knowledge-
creating, relationship-building, cultural development and economic growth (Anselin, et.al., 1997, 
Bottazzi and Petri, 2003, Breschi and Lissoni, 2009, Lazzeroni and Piccaluga, 2015). The challenge 
identified in this context is that the universities produce globally-mobile elites that intensify both 
inward and outward flows of knowledge, ideas, and capital (Swyngedouw, 1992). 
Without a triple helix mode of coalitions and stakeholder leadership at a regional level, policy 
interventions remain fragmented and one-off initiatives without creating synergies for propitious 
innovation (Benneworth, et.al., 2015). It is acknowledged that pre-existing linkages between local 
industry and university encourages entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurial behaviour builds new and 
enhances the old links, transforming the regional public-private interface into a collaborative platform 
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for knowledge flows (Lee, et.al., 2015). The approach in Scotland has evolved through broadly-based 
area initiatives to clusters to Intermediate Technology Institutes and key sector enterprise areas, not 
all have been successful but the underpinning principles of inclusion and partnership working are 
consistent with the good practice of triple helix models (Danson and Lloyd, 2012). Such regional 
dynamics represent a healthy regional cluster environment, encouraging new market entries as well 
as growth. The optimisation and orchestration of the triple helix interactions, however, is essential for 
the efficient management of costs and benefits. 
Analytical dissection of clusters based around small urban areas reveals that the universities represent 
sometimes the largest employer in the region, and present a gateway for the internationalisation of 
regional outputs. The universities, however, are governed by a specific administrative authority, which 
poses a question of the level of value capture and impact (Fig. 1) (Lazzeroni and Piccaluga, 2015). 
In the same way as universities are centres of innovation and knowledge, regional authorities are 
anchors for governing the innovation context, stirring collaboration across the university-industry 
interface and generating synergies across institutional boundaries. Regional triple helix spaces induce 
visibility and support for the creation of strong regional identities.  
It is acknowledged, however, that the driver for public-initiated growth often remains national 
government funding for innovation, which represents implementation of the national policy agenda 
that produces strong regional effects. More critical observations of this mechanism acknowledge that 
such an approach is associated with significant inefficiencies in the allocation of funds with often 
disappointing (Lawton Smith and Waters, 2015) and uneven development (Bailey et al., 2010; Bergum, 
2012; Cooke, 2001) results. An example of this is discussed in the Science Vale UK project by two UK 
counties (South Oxfordshire and Vale of White Horse), where entrepreneurial vision from the regional 
governing authority has created a triple helix space for a collaboration for public sector excellence and 
aspiring private sector competitiveness, but the lack of strong institutional leadership has prevented 
the generation of sustainable growth, synergies and spill-overs (Lawton Smith and Waters, 2015). 
The principal issue in UK economic development is the sharp territorial division between the over-
performing South East of the UK economy centred on London, but including its extensive city region, 
and the underperforming South West and North of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland 
(Regional Policy Commission, 1996; HM Treasury, 2001, 2007; Bailey et al., 2010). Within the individual 
regional economies there is a similar demarcation of relative performance, such as between core and 
peripheral and rural and urban areas (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; Danson and de Souza, 2012). There 
is a psychological dimension to this as well, as specific regions or communities are not only affected 
by external changes, but also may respond in different ways: a reflection of confidence and local 
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capacity (Cooke, 1985). Taken together, the regional agenda reflects the complexity of modern 
economies and the intrinsic changes taking place across national economic and industrial spaces 
(Todeva, 2014). 
The relatively differentiated performances over time of the different geographies of the UK are 
reflected in unemployment, social and community distress, and environmental impacts. Therefore, 
the challenges for the triple helix action differ across geographies. Although UK government has 
favoured capital mobility policies, and grants and incentives sought to encourage firms located in the 
South East to move to the underperforming regions (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000), the regional impact 
of these policies is very limited (Regional Policy Commission, 1996; Morgan, 2006). It can be argued 
(Bailey et al, 2010) that the former UK Coalition Government's removal of the region-wide RDAs from 
their respective landscapes in England undermined further regional strategic approaches to address 
discrepancies (Danson and Lloyd, 2012). The absence of regional economic partnerships 
complementing and paralleling the triple helix framework for innovation would be expected to 
exacerbate this loss (Cooke and Clifton, 2005; Danson et al., 1999).  
6. Conclusions 
RDAs in the UK and across the developed world are very much a product of their times and their 
specific regional contexts. Economic conditions and expectations, exogenous structural pressures, 
endogenous capacities, and institutional innovation combine to position RDAs with a broader portfolio 
of intervention (Danson et al., 2012). These are mediated through prevailing political ideologies 
regarding state, market and civil relations. The territorial dimensions to these parameters assume 
considerable importance as the spatial priorities of governments, national and devolved, establish the 
broad framework within which RDAs operate. The broad debate is over the politics of space: does a 
political geography of relative economic performance matter? Is there a political geography of 
competition and competitiveness? Is there evidence of a regional politics of triple helix interactions? 
How do the principles of regionalism and subsidiarity affect triple helix constellations and economic 
behaviour within a locale? How do different local governance practices induce a differentiated triple 
helix context? Are market-led approaches to governance complementary to triple helix and 
stakeholder approaches, bringing into play critical assumptions about the effectiveness of market 
penetration across competitive geographies and the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement on 
localised innovation capabilities. These questions are further disaggregated from national into 
regional, town and country, urban and rural, city and city-region levels. Yet, any such `laissez-faire' 
approach invokes consideration of the deeper social, economic, temporal, resource, and 
environmental costs of market engineered and government regulated space.  
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Regional governance and regional triple helix constellations are the main drivers shaping the politics 
and economics in a location space. Yet, these operate within their own constraints of national policy 
regimes, global competition and regulation, and university open door policy for knowledge flows. The 
principles of regionalism and subsidiarity emphasise that the most appropriate practice level for triple 
helix interactions is the level which promises the closest impact in terms of value creation and value 
capture. Regional competitiveness and economic growth, hence, are derivatives to localised triple 
helix actors and activities. 
Within a market-based philosophy which asserts the rationale for the relatively free play of business 
interests there remains also a powerful case for RDAs to operate at a subnational scale. Even in the 
context of market conditions, some arrangements for stakeholder engagement and governance are 
required to address the more localised market failures in land, capital, and labour markets, if only to 
correct local and regional capacities to respond to changing business and market actions. Uneven 
economic conditions create territorial costs and disadvantages, and the RDA would appear to be an 
appropriate model of intervention to provide more coherent spaces for business-based and market-
based activities. The record of Scottish performances in enhancing its key sectors of Food & Drink 
(including agriculture & fisheries), Creative Industries (including digital), Sustainable Tourism, Energy 
(including renewables), Financial & Business Services, Life Sciences, and Universities (Scottish 
Government, 2015) is demonstrated by the very strong growth in the food and drink partnership in 
recent years (exports up by a third in five years, Scottish Food and Drink, 2014).  
The location-based Scottish enterprise areas are focused on four sectors covering 16 sites: Life 
sciences; Low carbon/renewable; General manufacturing; and Growth sectors and again these have 
nurtured increased activities (Scottish Enterprise, 2015). The key elements of a triple helix approach 
are embedded into each of these approaches to regional economic development with the RDAs 
(Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise), universities and private sector companies 
all active participants, along with other partners. These can be contrasted with the piecemeal, poorly 
co-ordinated and crowded landscape in England where wasteful pursuit of investment and 
development by small partnerships in competition with other LEPs (local economic partnerships) 
struggles to deliver coherent outcomes (Lawton Smith and Waters, 2015; Bailey et al., 2010). 
Regional authorities undertake a leadership role in creating institutional space for the functioning of 
collaborative triple helix interactions, and hold responsibilities for the effective implementation of 
national policies as well. Effective regional government directly influences the regional effects in 
national innovation systems, facilitating and enhancing localised stakeholder engagement and 
collaboration. Governance and intermediation are the tools of regional authorities to promote and 
position new implementation practices for economic development. Weak regional authorities induce 
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weak triple helix constellations, resulting in fragmentation and lack of positive externalities, while 
active triple helix environments at a regional level generate sustainable growth patterns, as already 
seen in the literature.  
The Scottish Development Agency, for example, as with the equivalent bodies in Wales and Northern 
Ireland, operated for the first few years under its original remit before being reengineered as a 
business-led development model (also eventually being renamed as Scottish Enterprise to reflect this 
changing remit). This process of change to better serve as instruments of business growth and 
development has continued since and has created vibrant networks across the university-industry 
interface, embedding the policy implementation and impact into regional spillovers. Hence the RDA 
in Scotland serves to create greater coherence of the economic, social, environmental, and political 
space, supporting a localised triple helix constellation. Scottish Enterprise secures economic gains 
from policy and institutional integrated working, enhancing both the value creation and value capture 
from triple helix and stakeholder engagement and commitment. Its ability and capacity, however, to 
fulfil such roles is dependent upon its position in the structure of government and the form and nature 
of devolution in its specific regional context. 
RDAs can mobilise appropriate environmental factors in relation to achieving economic priorities and 
can operate in the context of localised dynamic conditions reflecting the very complex processes of 
change taking place in different localities and communities. RDA-led triple helix constellations employ 
regional or national institutions to implement localised political and economic agendas and to address 
localised stakeholder demands. Our analysis of the role and impact of institutions, governance and 
government support on regional capabilities for growth reveals the complementarity between 
national priorities, regional urge, and the response of the public and private sector to localised policy 
initiatives. Regional governance and regional triple helix constellations lead the engagement of 
stakeholders with the national agenda for innovation and entrepreneurship as well as serving their 
localised needs. It is already recognised that the building blocks of national innovation systems and 
the regional innovation environments localised around the local university acting as an open door for 
ideas, creativity, skills and entrepreneurial ambitions, empowered by localised employer activities.  
The impact of triple helices on economic growth and sustainable innovation outcomes is best 
observed at the local / regional scale where industry, university, and other public sector and third 
sector actors can work effectively with local authorities as is evident, for example, with the emphasis 
on community planning in local service provision which also incorporates regeneration and social 
inclusion activities, as well as pursuing innovation and smart specialisation targets. Finally, experience 
shows that in the wider processes of governance the RDAs can contribute to the strengthening of 
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regional and local political capital and institutional capacity to address change and can serve to secure 
a wider political legitimacy for local interventions to those changes. 
This territorial demarcation is accentuated not only by resource availability considerations, inherited 
industrial and corporate practices, and the priorities of government policy which combine to create a 
very evident variegated economic spatial landscape. Geographic spaces are made visible and 
connected to global resource and knowledge flows through their regional triple helix constellations 
and their localised stakeholder engagement.  
The existing geographical inequity is compounded by the uneven capacities of different regional and 
local communities to address change. Hence, empowering triple helix interface at local, regional, or 
community level, hence can strengthen the governance function for concerted action and response 
to policy initiatives. Today, the RDA organisational form continues to represent the basis of regional 
economic policy and smart specialisation action across much of Europe (Danson, Halkier and Bellini, 
2012), and it is paramount that the remaining questions now turn on the more deliberate integration 
of RDAs into the structure of government and the public policies at large. The RDA model hence offers 
an opportunity to address macroeconomic challenges across national space whilst seeking greater 
coherence, consistency, and confidence at the subnational level.  
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